The Royal Association of Netherlands Shipowners (KVNR) is keen to see the safest possible passage achieved as soon as possible. Therefore, the KVNR requests the Dutch cabinet to commit to:

• Protection against aerial attacks: rapid structural measures under Operation Prosperity Guardian or under European deployment, for example by setting up supported Red Sea transits, with a central communication point for ships sailing there being a key focus;
• Protection against maritime attacks: allowing the deployment of VPDs to enhance the protection effect of OPG, minimising the risk of attack from boats or drones;
• a European deployment through mission ATALANTA, mission EMASOH or the Combined Maritime Forces.

The KVNR has written to the Dutch cabinet informing them of these requests.

Operation Prosperity Guardian provides defensive protection
The Netherlands is participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) to provide protection for ships in the Red Sea. A major attack that took place on 10 January 2024 demonstrated that the countries currently participating in OPG can repel offensives effectively. This includes the adequate repulsion of airborne attacks. The defensive nature of OPG currently reduces the risks to ships in the region. In addition, the European Commission is currently looking for ways to provide protection for ships transiting the Red Sea. It is expected that any European deployment could start in the second half of February 2024.

Participation in Operation Poseidon Archer increases risk for Dutch ships
Besides participating in OPG, the Netherlands and Denmark are the only EU member states taking part in Operation Poseidon Archer. This has an offensive nature in order to eliminate the source of air attacks on international shipping. Operation Poseidon Archer involves a very limited coalition of only a few countries; this seems to have increased the risk to all Dutch ships* being targeted by Houthi attacks. For Dutch shipowners, it is important that the Houthi’s potential focus on ships with Dutch connections is minimised as soon as possible, for example by expanding the coalition of Operation Poseidon Archer.

Armed security on board
The southernmost part of the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the entire Gulf of Aden have been designated under the Bill for the Protection of the Merchant Navy (WtBK) permissible for the deployment of private armed security guards on board Dutch-flagged ships. Based on the structure of the WtBK, private security guards may only be deployed if this is also permitted for teams of armed soldiers, also known as the Vessel Protection Detachment (VPD).

The Dutch government currently advises against passage through the Red Sea, and the Ministry of Defence does not currently consider it responsible to deploy VPDs in the Red Sea region. This means that it is currently not possible to deploy private security guards on Dutch-flagged ships. It is partly for this reason that no Dutch-flagged ships are sailing through the Red Sea.

*The term ‘all Dutch ships’ is meant not only to refer to those ships sailing under Dutch flag but also those under Dutch control but with a foreign flag. The size of the fleet under Dutch control consists of around 2,600 ships, of which 1,100 are sailing under the Dutch flag (4th position within the EEA). 

Recent developments for the dutch the Dutch maritime industry

The Dutch shipping industry is active worldwide in various market segments such as bulk goods (for example wheat, sand, wood), tankers, sea tugs and offshore work vessels, with the vast majority of the fleet operating in European waters. Dutch shipowners are not represented in the intercontinental transport of containers and crude oil.

Ships from Dutch shipowners regularly sail through the Suez Canal, and therefore also through the Red Sea region. In ‘normal’ times this involves the passage of an average of one to two ships per day. This not only accounts for ships that transport goods, but also ships working on location, such as workboats and tugboats.

Due to the current situation in the Red Sea region, a detour via the Cape of Good Hope is a realistic option. However, this route involves more sailing days due to the extra nautical miles. How many days that is depends on, among other things, the type of cargo, the ship and the weather conditions. The extra costs for fuel, crew, supplies, maintenance and insurance are an important factor in this. This can vary from several hundred thousand to over a million dollars. It is important for the shipowner to be able to pass these costs on to the customer, otherwise this will damage the financial position of the shipping company. This is not possible for every shipping company. On the other hand, the costs for security guards and the costs of passing through the Suez Canal, for example, will be eliminated. The longer voyage not only affects the cost of the voyage, but also ensures that the ship can carry out fewer jobs in the same time. If this situation takes a longer period of time, it may result in more vessels being needed to serve the international market.